Michigan Law Review
Volume 99

Issue 4

2001

Conjunction and Aggregation
Saul Levmore
University of Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Evidence Commons, Judges Commons, and
the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

CONJUNCTION AND AGGREGATION
Saul Levmore*

INTRODUCTION

This Article begins with the puzzle of why the law avoids the issue
of conjunctive probability. Mathematically inclined observers might,
for example, employ the "product rule," multiplying the probabilities
associated with several events or requirements in order to assess a
combined likelihood, but judges and lawyers seem otherwise inclined.
Courts and statutes might be explicit about the manner in which mul
tiple requirements should be combined, but they are not. Thus, it is of
ten unclear whether a factfinder should assess if condition A was more
likely than not to be present - and then go on to see whether condi
tion B satisfied this standard - or whether the factfinder's task is to
ascertain if both A and B can together, or at once, satisfy the standard.
A mathematically inclined judge or jury that thought a tort defendant
.6 likely to have been negligent and .7 likely to have caused plaintiff's
harm might conclude that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the preponder
ance of the evidence standard because the chance of both require
ments being met is surely less than either alone and, indeed, less than
.5. Yet, the law often instructs the jury to find the defendant liable, or
is strangely ambiguous in its instructions. Legal practice seems at odds
with scientific logic, or at least with probabilistic reasoning. I will refer
to this puzzle as the "math-law divide." Although this divide is en
countered frequently in law, its puzzling character is unfamiliar to
most lawyers and (even) legal scholars, and it is missed entirely by
most litigants and judges.
This Article seeks to explain or rationalize law's suppression of the
product rule, or indeed any explicit alternative strategy for dealing
with the conjunction issue. Part I discusses in greater detail the nature
of the math-law divide and a number of traditional reactions to the
puzzle. The Article then advances the idea that the process of aggre
gating multiple jurors' assessments hides valuable information. First,
Part H.B. posits that the Condorcet Jury Theorem indicates that
*
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agreement among multiple jurors might raise our level of confidence
in a particular determination beyond what the jurors themselves indi
vidually report. Second, Part 11.C. urges that a supermajority's mean
or median voter is likely to have a different assessment from that
gained from the marginal juror. As such, a supermajority (or unanim
ity) rule may take the place of the product rule where there are multi
ple requirements for liability or guilt. An attempt to extract this infra
marginal information more directly would likely generate strategic
behavior problems in juries. Part III extends this analysis to panels of
judges, for whom "outcome voting" may (somewhat similarly) substi
tute for the product rule.
I.
A.

THE CONJUNCTION PROBLEM

Law's Suppression of the Conjunction Problem
and the Product Rule

Consider the straightforward problem of combining two judgments
concerning two or more elements of a legal claim. If, for example, the
law holds A liable to B when A is negligent and when this negligence
has (proximately) caused B's injury, a factfinder must evaluate the
likelihood of A's negligence and the likelihood of the causal link be
tween this negligent behavior and B 's injury. An illustrative jury in
struction is as follows:
In order to prove the essential elements of plaintiff's claim, the burden is
on the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence in the
case, the following facts: First, that the defendant was negligent in one or
more of the particulars alleged; and Second, that the defendant's negli
gence was a proximate cause of some injury and consequent damage sus
tained by the plaintiff.1

1. EDWARD J. DEVITI ET AL., 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL
§ 80.17 (4th ed. 1987). Nearly identical language is used in actual cases. See, e.g., Folks v.
Kirby Forest Ind. Inc., 10 F.3d 1173, 1176 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting language used by dis
trict court below while reversing and remanding on other grounds). There is some variety
across states, as the elements of a tort claim might be described as two or three or even one
in number. Thus, in Alabama:
The plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent and that his negligence proximately caused
certain injuries suffered by the plaintiff. . . . This presents for your determination the fol
lowing. Was the defendant negligent as claimed by the plaintiff? If so, was such negligence of
the defendant the proximate cause of any injury sustained by the plaintiff as claimed? If you
find both of the above issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate him for the injury so sustained?
ALABAMA PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL 21.01 (1974). But in Colorado:
For the plaintiff to recover from the defendant on his claim of negligence, you must find that
all of the following have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. The plaintiff
had injuries; 2. The defendant was negligent; and 3. The defendant's negligence was a cause
of the plaintiffs injuries. If you find that any one or more of these [three) statements has not
been proved, then your verdict must be for the defendant. On the other hand, if you find
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Quite generally, juries are told that the "essential question is whether
the evidence taken as a whole, both direct and circumstantial, estab
lishes every element of the plaintiffs' case by a preponderance of the
evidence. "2
Imagine now that the factfinder concludes that there is a .7 chance
of negligence and a .6 chance of causation.3 Doctrinally, the law seems
to require that A pay if and only if A is negligent and causes B's harm.
The question is whether this "and" is conjunctive. Most people who
are experienced in probabilistic thinking hurry to say that A should be
liable if A is both negligent and the causal agent, and that this com
bined probability is (.7)(.6) .42. The product of the two probabilities,
or likelihood of these two events, is thus less than the .5 hurdle estab=

that all of these [three] statements have been proved, then your verdict must be for the
plaintiff.
COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL 9.1 (4th ed.). Oregon expresses the ideas of negli
gence and causation almost as if these were a single element: "To recover, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in at least one
respect charged in plaintiffs complaint which was a cause of damage to the plaintiff."
OREGON JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES 10.01 (1984).
Some states are more ambiguous in their treatment of the conjunction issue. For example, Florida's standard jury instructions read:
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against (defendant) are:
whether (defendant) was negligent in (describe negligence); and, if so, whether such negli
gence was a legal cause of injury sustained by claimant. If the greater weight of the evidence
does not support the claim of (claimant), then your verdict should be for (defendant).
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 3.5, at le- 2, 3.6, 3.7 (1967). Al
though this instruction is somewhat ambiguous on whether the weight of the evidence must
support the entire claim or individual issues, Florida and other states with similar jury in
structions seem to suppress the product rule as well.
Instructions might also be given regarding the meaning of the preponderance standard,
of negligence, and so forth. Even where judges are inclined to roll everything they wish to
communicate into one (ambiguous) sentence, the jury may return with questions as to how
to combine its findings. As will become clear, there are many ways to try and avoid the con
junction problem, but I prefer in this Article to show that the apparent illogic of the law may
actually be clever in light of aggregation problems. Other commentators have of course
noted and argued about the law's ambiguity and the correct approach to multiple require
ments. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401,
405 -08 (1986) (arguing that the conventional but misguided view of trials is what makes the
conventional view of probability as applied to law seem erratic and irrational); Dale A.
Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical Interpretation of the Logic
of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947 (1986) (noting math-law divide and emphasizing ambiguity of
jury instructions). As a descriptive matter, there is some dispute as to what courts actually
do, and as a normative matter there is no agreement on what they ought to do. I weigh in
with my own descriptive and normative views, but the more important point here is to show
the possibility of a connection between conjunction and aggregation, and in turn the possi
bility of seeing prevailing practices, both as to conjunction (or not) and as to supermajority
votes, in a new and fairly optimistic light.

2. LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO
(1999) (quoting jury instruction regarding circumstantial proof).

A CIVIL ACTION 626

3. There are several ways to interpret these numbers. Our factfinder might reason that if
he or she observed evidence of this sort ten times, it would be the case that the defendant
was negligent seven times and not negligent three times.
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lished by the preponderance of the evidence ("POE") standard nor
mally applied to civil claims.4
In contrast, most lawyers who have thought about this subject re
gard the (representative) jury instructions as calling for holding the
defendant liable in this case because plaintiff apparently satisfies the
first requirement (inasmuch as 7 exceeds the .5 trigger established by
the POE standard), and also satisfies the second requirement (again,
inasmuch as .6 exceeds the .5 benchmark). At the risk of oversimplifi
cation, the problem is that the mathematics of the matter instructs us
to multiply the two probabilities, following what is known as the
"product rule" (for combining independent probabilistic assess
ments).5 Law, however, appears not to abide by this rule. Hence the
math-law divide.
.

B.

Reactions to the Math-Law Divide

There are a number of conventional reactions to the math-law di
vide, including simple denial. In asking whether it is more likely than
not that two coin tosses will yield two heads more than one in three
times, everyone would agree that the problem solver should multiply
. 5 times .5 to see that the answer is no, for two heads are expected but
one in four times. But when the questions are whether A was more
likely than not to have been driving negligently and whether such
driving caused B's neck injury (where there is some chance that B has
no real injury or a preexisting condition), reasonable people are com
fortable with the idea that if each answer is that it is .6 likely we should
stop there and find A responsible. We are, perhaps, not looking for the
conjoined probability that both things are true at the same time. The
question is why intuitions about conjunction vary.
1.

Independence

One reaction to the law's disinclination to use the product rule fo
cuses on the likelihood that issues like negligence and causation are
not likely to be perfectly independent of one another. The product
rule applies only where the events or requirements in question are in
dependent. That interdependence changes the way we ought to com4. The "product" or multiplication rule applies whenever two events are independent.
Thus, there is a .25 chance of seeing two heads in a row when a fair coin is tossed, because
for each coin the probability of a head is .5 and (.5)(.5) .25. Independence, prior probabili
ties, and other nuances are taken up presently.
=

5. The product rule is but one strategy for dealing with the conjunction issue, but in or
der to avoid repetition I will use the terms in a way that approaches interchangeability. Law
avoids the conjunction issue; a reasonable and nearly universal approach (outside of law) to
this issue is to deploy the product rule; law therefore can be said to suppress the product
rule.
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bine probabilities is obvious; the chance of flipping three heads in a
row with a fair coin is (.5)(.5)(.5) .125; it is expected to occur once in
eight times. But if I know that the coin is weighted so that it will al
ways come out the same, I need only flip it once to see whether it is
weighted one way or the other. Now the tosses are completely inter
dependent and the probability of three consecutive heads (or tails) is
.5.
If factfinders are given multiple requirements for liability, and
these requirements are highly interdependent, then a blanket instruc
tion to apply the product rule would seriously underdeter defendants
and undercompensate plaintiffs compared to the ideal set out by law.
To take an extreme case, if a factfinder assesses the likelihood of de
fendant's negligence in a case by defendant's demeanor as a witness,
then it is quite likely that a comparable assessment of causation
amounts to drawing the same conclusion twice in a way that makes the
estimates highly interdependent. Somewhat similarly, if B claims that
pharmaceutical company A's nondisclosure caused B's allergic reac
tion, then it may well be that causation and negligence are virtually the
same question. If A's drug has the side-effect that B asserts, then the
factfinder might well conclude that A was negligent not to have
warned of it, and the same inquiry is likely to drive the causation as
sessment. If events are completely interdependent and the factfinder
thinks that each is still .6 likely, then .6 rather than .36 is our best as
sessment of the likelihood that A satisfies the two requirements for li
ability. Where multiple requirements are entirely interrelated, applica
tion of the product rule is unnecessary. Moreover, there are cases but only some - in which a greater likelihood of one requirement
(such as negligence) does imply a greater likelihood of the other (such
as causation) if only because it becomes less likely that the plaintiff
would have suffered the injury if defendant had avoided its failure as
to the first requirement.6
The concern for independence is most convincing if factfinders are
incapable of following instructions regarding interdependent and in
dependent events. It may be that where elements are independent,
factfinders allow their view of one element to influence their assess
ment of another.7 But even so, if there is so much interdependence be
tween two requirements for a decision that we are better off not mul
tiplying a factfinder's estimates, then it often follows that there is little
need to have the second requirement in the first place. If the connec
tion between two requirements is nearly perfect, so that whenever
=

6. In the torts setting the idea is that absent defendant's misstep, the chance that plain
tiff would have been injured is very low. "[T]he more serious the breach of duty and the less
the amount of unavoidable accident, the less proof that should be required of the plaintiff on
the cause in fact issue." MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 567 (1994).
7. For evidence to this effect, see infra Section l.B.5 and accompanying notes.
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there is negligence there is also causation, for instance, then the law
need only ask whether it is more likely than not that there has been
negligence. Generally speaking, if it is worthwhile to ask multiple
questions, then logic or math suggests that we do better applying the
product rule - though we need to be careful about independence and
conditional probabilities.8 But such generalizations may be beside the
point because we can instruct the factfinder(s) not only about multiple
requirements and the product rule, but also about the necessary modi
fications if the same factfinder deems the requirements to be some
what interdependent.
2.

Misuse ofProbabilities

A second reaction to the math-law divide is that factfinders, (espe
cially lay juries) and attorneys are likely to misuse probabilities.9 This
point is sometimes made in association with the previous argument
that multiple requirements are often interdependent.
The misuse point is often associated with a famous case in criminal
law in which the prosecutor at trial emphasized certain facts (modified
here for expository purposes) and encouraged the jury to make con
clusions based on the product rule. The prosecutor stressed that the
defendants' appearances matched eyewitness reports of a perpetra
tor's hair color (blond), hair style (pony tail), companion's race
(black), automobile color (yellow), and so forth.10 If each characteris
tic were a one in ten possibility, and the defendant presents a match
for four such features, the prosecutor or expert witness is tempted to
say that there is but a (.1)(.1)(.1)(.1), or only a one in ten-thousand
chance that the defendant is not the perpetrator.
But this application of the product rule is normally absurd. In the
first place, it suffers from an ex post flaw, amounting to a serious sort
of selection bias. The one-in-ten-thousand claim might be appropriate
where a witness had described these four traits, and then a perpetrator
was arrested somewhere else, perhaps after committing a similar
crime, and the question was whether the arrested person might also be
responsible for the first crime. But where the police pick up a suspect
8. Thus, if a jury thinks that defendant was negligent, it is sensible for it to ask whether
given defendant's negligence and given plaintiffs injury, it is more likely than not that defen
dant's negligence caused plaintiff's injury. This sort of argument is developed in A.P. Dawid,
The Difficulty About Conjunction, 36 THE STATISTICIAN 91 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 passim (1971).
10. See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1968) (concluding that defendant should
not have had his guilt determined "by the odds," where prosecutor misapplied the product
rule in remarkable fashion). The case is discussed in Maya Bar-Hillel, Probabilistic Analysis
in Legal Factfinding, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 267, 268-70 (1984), and Tribe, supra note 9,
at 1341-42 & n.40.
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because this suspect matches the characteristics reported by a witness,
the product rule tells us very little. The police have searched the
population for someone who presents the four traits, and it now adds
no extra information to find out that these traits are fairly unlikely to
be present in any one randomly drawn person. It might be useful to
know how likely it was that an individual (not randomly) selected by
the police had no alibi for a given time, or how large the local popula
tion was (so that the police could not look across hundred of millions
of people to find the one-in-ten-thousand combination), but without
this sort of information multiplying probabilities leads only to miscon
ceptions. The product rule is also misapplied to the extent blond hair
is more likely than other colored hair to be in pony tails, or blond
haired persons are more likely to drive yellow cars. If these links are
not random, then the events are not independent (though likely to
multiply out to a large denominator anyway).
I set aside this reaction to the puzzle of the math-law divide be
cause it is unlikely that some actual or potential misuse of the product
rule explains why it is avoided entirely in every setting. The preferred
reaction to misapplication of a tool is normally to educate lawyers and
even jurors in order to reduce this misuse. Moreover, in the criminal
context we hesitate to convict when there is fear of bias or misused
evidence, but it is hard to see why this tilt toward individual liberty
would lead law to prefer that A pay B in a civil case, even though it
was more likely than not that A was not both negligent and the cause
of B's injury. Finally, the product rule can be used and abused in favor
of both prosecutors and criminal defendants, as it can help civil plain
tiffs and (in other cases) civil defendants. Given that a prosecutor
might need to establish several elements of a crime in order to prevail,
it will sometimes be the prosecution that prefers to suppress the prod
uct rule. Perhaps the best conclusion to draw is that the suppression of
the product rule in criminal law might be understood to follow from
the possibility of misuse of probabilistic evidence and reasoning along
with a disinclination to intervene and do more harm than good. But if
some role is played by the fear that the product rule will be misused in
favor of convictions in criminal law, then we might expect a bias in
civil law against recovery - which would normally mean an inclina
tion in favor of the product rule, inasmuch as it reduces fractional
numbers through multiplication.11
1 1 . Of course, the product rule could often be used in favor of plaintiffs, but courts and
litigants have not recognized the necessary arguments. Imagine, for example, a plaintiff in a
products liability suit who should win if she can show that defendant's product was defec
tively designed (D), defectively manufactured (M), or sold with an inadequate warning (W).
Here, the multiple requirements are not to be conjoined because they are alternative routes
to success. If plaintiff can show only that each claim is but .4 likely to be true, the lawyer ex
pects plaintiff to lose - but the product rule suggests that plaintiff should win. There is, after
all, a .6 chance that defendant did not produce a defective design, D, and similarly a .6
chance of not-M. If D and M are independent, then there is a .36 chance that defendant was
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Objections to Numbers and Probabilities

A closely related reaction is that the puzzle is nothing new but
rather another example of law's disinclination to ask factfinders spe
cific questions, especially regarding numbers. We feel comfortable
asking whether something meets the preponderance of the evidence
standard, or whether proof in a criminal trial is strong enough to
eliminate reasonable doubt, but even these standards are rarely re
duced to probabilities or to numerical guidelines. Wherever possible,
law avoids mathematical tasks.
A problem with this last generalization is the slipperiness of the
"wherever possible" concept. We regularly ask juries or judges to en
gage in difficult damage assessments, and this produces something of a
puzzle as to why we do not ask these factfinders for precise probabilis
tic estimates.12 I suggest below that, at least in the case of multi
member juries or panels, we might lose more than we would gain by
asking for numerical assessments because of the danger of strategic
behavior. In contrast, we might have little to lose by asking for preci
sion where damages are concerned.
Still, it is fair to wonder how we might instruct juries or judges to
follow the product rule if we wished to do so. Indeed, what does it
mean to ask any factfinder for a probabilistic assessment of a require
ment such as causation or negligence? A leading possibility is to ex
press the problem or task in terms of frequencies13 - although this can

well-behaved with respect to both design and manufacture. The possibility of W, a third
route for plaintiff, further reduces the likelihood (to .216) that defendant should be ab
solved; with three such routes, it is quite likely that we err by requiring plaintiff to satisfy the
preponderance standard for at least one alternative on its own. In this example, conjunction
issues arise where there are not multiple requirements but alternative routes for a decision;
the plaintiffs alternatives amount to the presence of multiple requirements (and conjunc
tion) for defendant to succeed.
Unfortunately, the court that has come closest to recognizing this issue of reverse con
junction failed to grasp the full power of the pro-plaintiff argument. See Cheshire Med. Ctr.
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 49 F.3d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1995) (acknowledging the product rule issue
but, by focusing on plaintiff's burden rather than the conjoined likelihood of defendant's
avoiding all alternative claims, missing the applicability of the product rule). I will return to
this "reverse conjunction" problem below. It presents no special difficulty for the theory ad
vanced here.
12. We ask factfinders to overcome their math anxieties with respect to things other
than damages. Thus, some jurisdictions impose market share liability where there are "re
curring cases," and some give recovery for "lost chances." See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic
Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
13. Following the framing strategy advanced by Gerd Gigerenzer, The Psychology of
Good Judgment: Frequency Formats and Simple Algorithms, 16 MED. DECISION MAKING
273 (1996) (discussing the use and accuracy of "fast and frugal algorithms" that help people
perceive statistical or probabilistic relationships). See also Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hof
frage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102
PSYCHOL. REV. 684 (1995).
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be quite difficult to do for most tort cases.14 Another approach is to
translate probabilistic questions into descriptions of wagers or, per
haps more accurately, wager-like tests for risk-neutral persons. If a
judge, juror, or legislator were to ask for an explanation of the POE
rule with respect, say, to causation, it would be fair to say that the
question is whether A "caused" B's injury, and that if the evidence
leads the decisionmaker to believe that she would be indifferent as to
which side of a wager to take - where the winner of the wager is the
person who correctly predicts how a large panel of voters would re
gard the evidence as to causation and would "vote" for or against cau
sation - then this decisionmaker should say that there is a .5 chance
of causation. The large panel is appealing because of a theorem, dis
cussed presently, which describes conditions under which the larger
the group the more correct it is likely to be. Similarly, an assessment of
.8 should reflect the fact that the decisionmaker would give 4-1 odds
that a majority of the hypothetical large group would vote that A
caused B's injury. The wager metaphor could no doubt be a real self
assessment tool, but the point is that the metaphor explains the notion
of uncertain and probabilistic assessment.
One weakness of the wager approach is that it requires some base
line or idealized conception of the perfect decisionmaker. We cannot
ask a juror or judge to imagine betting on the truth. After all, various
legal rules will have excluded some relevant evidence. A problem with
appealing to faith or reason in a large group of voters, who have heard
the same evidence and instructions observed and admitted at trial,15 is
that our decisionmaker may comprehend flaws in this approach. A
large group might exhibit herd behavior or polarization, for example.
There is surely something awkward about asking a judge (or even a
jury) to try and imitate a mob.
4.

Evaluating Competing Stories

A fourth reaction shifts the ground of the inquiry a bit and insists
that the fundamental task of a trial (at least in adversarial systems) is
to pose two competing stories in order for a factfinder to say which
story is more likely to be true.16 B tells a story about his injury, and A
then responds with a claim that A could not have been negligent be14. We do not want to ask the jury to imagine 100 cases in which there are injuries of the
sort experienced here, followed by the question of how often defendant was negligent (and
then how often in this subset defendant caused the injury) because this encourages hindsight
bias of a sort.

15. This is an important condition because without it jurors will feel encouraged to ex
pand the number of voters on their own through consultation and the like. We might en
courage jurors to see themselves as representatives of a large group, but one that is con
strained to work with certain information.
16. See Allen, supra note 1.
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cause A took a set of precautions, and so forth. Indeed, it is sometimes
said that every successful tort claim has the plaintiff describe an un
taken precaution that the defendant should have taken.17 Presumably,
the defendant then disputes the claim or, at least, the causal connec
tion between the untaken precaution and the injury at issue. In any
event, the more we imagine the factfinder to be comparing two stories,
the less it matters whether the factfinder multiplies probabilities.
There is much to be said for this reaction, though perhaps more in
some areas of law than others. Empirical evidence about factfinding is
necessary to evaluate the claim. Imagine, for example, that plaintiff's
"story,'' X, involves two elements, assessed as being .7 and .6 likely to
have occurred or to have been satisfied. If defendant tells a story that
is .3 likely, this approach suggests that we move our attention away
from the fact that the plaintiff's story is .42 likely, so to speak, and
look instead at the fact that .42 is greater than .3. So far so good. But
what if the defendant says that what happened was not X, as the plain
tiff claims, but rather either Y or Z. Is defendant (or plaintiff) really
required to choose one possible story? The combined likelihood of ei
ther Y or Z might be more than .42. In short, I have little doubt but
that successful litigants weave stories and artfully compare their sto
ries with those produced by adversaries, but this way of thinking re
solves the puzzle of the math-law divide only if we somehow think that
law insists that each side simplify its argument in this way. And, again,
even if we compare the best story on one side with the best mustered
on the other (so that arguments in the alternative are deeply dis
counted), the product rule might be helpful as it operates within a sin
gle story. A mathematician might choose a different winner than most
uninstructed lay (or legally trained) factfinders, if these factfinders are
told only that plaintiff's side overcomes its burden of proof if and only
if it shows that each of two requirements is more likely than not to
have been met in its winning story.18
17. See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
18. Thus, when told a story about "Bill" (an "intelligent, but unimaginative" thirty-four
year-old), subjects in a psychology experiment regularly assessed the likelihood that Bill was
an accountant who also played jazz as greater than the likelihood that Bill was an accountant
or jazz hobbyist. It appears that the compound story of Bill as an accountant who plays jazz
for a hobby is more appealing, if that is the right word, than the story of Bill as a mere ac
countant or jazz hobbyist, even though, as a mathematical proposition, the likelihood of the
conjunctive event (accountant and jazz hobbyist) is, of course, less likely than the single
event (accountant).
In these studies, subjects were not asked to generate numerical assessments but rather to
rank the likelihood of various stories or characteristics (including both compound and single
ones), so that we do not know whether the conjoining error they made involved underesti
mates of the likelihood of the single characteristic or overestimates of the compound charac
teristics. It is difficult, therefore, to take from these studies any easy conclusions about law.
It is possible that factfinders seriously overestimate conjoined events, because the entire
story is somehow more appealing, and that law does nothing to offset this either because
lawmakers suffer from the same psychological bias or because lawmakers think there is no
point in fighting human nature. But it is also possible that factfinders generate reasonable
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Rational actors aside, the "competing stories" approach is easily
linked to the interesting psychology literature which suggests that,
quite apart from any problem with numbers or math, people have dif
ficulty thinking logically about conjunctive probabilities.
5.

A Results-Orientated Approach

Yet another reaction begins with the intuition that not all applica
tions of the product rule are alike. If the factfinder assesses the likeli
hood of defendant's negligence as .8, and the likelihood of this negli
gence as having caused plaintiff's injury as .6, some observers (and
perhaps jurors and judges) will be comfortable with a decision in favor
of liability because of the intuition that making negligent parties pay
"too much" is harmless or even healthy. I should rush to add that
other observers, and for all we know other factfinders, are likely to fo
cus elsewhere, tilting toward liability, perhaps, when there is a high
likelihood of causation even though the negligence requirement is not
quite met, or the product rule leaves us below the POE point. This lat
ter view is consistent with a preference for strict liability, and with a
bit of imagination it is encouraged by a preference for partial or prob
abilistic recoveries as well.
One problem with this sort of explanation is that it is quite specific
while the suppression of the product rule is nearly universal, except
perhaps in criminal law.19 In other words, the product rule sometimes
favors plaintiffs and sometimes favors defendants, but its suppression
is not tailored accordingly and is not limited to such areas as the zone
between negligence and strict liability.20
assessments of multiple events and simply underestimate single events that are not embed
ded in complete and appealing stories. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments
of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 91-96 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).

19. In criminal law, the defense is given some latitude. It is conventional for the defense
to remind the jury of all the small doubts that have been raised and to imply that they com
bine to leave more than a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the law (once again) suppresses
the nature of this combinatorial process. It is not surprising that in criminal law we are espe
cially disinclined to attach real numbers to standards. The product rule suggests that the jury
engage in some multiplication; lay (statistically unsophisticated) intuitions suggest addition;
a third, reasonable view might require that at least one of these doubts on its own needs to
be substantial enough to meet the reasonable doubt standard. After all, if reasonable doubt
means that one has a reason for the doubt, then perhaps a check on this reason is that it not
be trivial. On the other hand, it can be uniquely held. A jury can acquit even when each ju
ror points to a different reasonable doubt, but there are other elements that jurors might
need to agree upon. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) (holding that, in a
continuing criminal enterprise case under 21 U.S.C. § 848, jurors are required to agree
unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also as to
which specific violations made up the continuing series). I do not pursue these puzzling rules
here.
20. For the claim that suppression can (somehow) offset the lack of a partial liability
rule, see Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence
Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001).
__
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II. AGGREGATION AND THE PRODUCT RULE IN JURIES
A.

Introduction

In American law, at least, the sort of factfinding referred to here is
frequently carried out by juries, often consisting of twelve members
and nearly always instructed to return unanimous or supermajority
verdicts.21 Such factfinding requires the aggregation and assessment of
(like but not identical) views. The arguments offered below show that
group factfinding is likely to produce ·probabilistic assessments that
underestimate the numbers, or likelihoods, that the product rule
would have us multiply. I do not suggest that lawmakers consciously
suppress the product rule in order to compensate for these under
assessments; indeed, there is little reason to think that the great ma
jority of lawmakers have given any thought whatever to the product
rule. But there is an interesting connection between our practices with
respect to aggregation and conjunction - if only because one leads to
overestimates while the other leads to underestimates - and this con
nection might serve as a kind of explanation, rationalization, or vehi
cle for understanding the suppression of the product rule in law. A
more ambitious conjecture, explored in Part 11.C below, is that the su
permajority norm (which as we will see plays an important role in
generating underassessments) is a reaction to the frequency with
which juries deal with cases involving multiple requirements for liabil
ity - where the product rule is most apt.
In Part III, I turn to cases where juries are not deployed. There is
the obvious question of what we should expect when factfinding is in
the hands of a single judge, so that there are no aggregation issues.
There is also the question of how the law treats the product rule when
panels of judges (as opposed to lay jurors) are involved.
B.

The Product Rule and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

The Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that where each voter has
more than an even chance of being right on some matter, then the
more voters we have the closer we get to a probability of 1.0 of getting
the matter right by abiding by a majority vote. A group, or jury, does
better than an individual (where the assumption rules out the case
where the individual is an identifiable expert).22 An obvious implica21. As far as I can tell, no state encourages simple majority verdicts. See infra note 33.
22. Condorcet's 1785 work is discussed in DENNIS c. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL
158-59 (1996). The theorem assumes that there is a "right" answer to the ques
tion at hand, that each voter is equally likely to know the right answer, or at least that each is
more likely than not to discern the correct answer, and that we have no way of identifying
those who are most likely to be right or even likely to benefit from deliberation. On some
issues an expert will obviously do better than a large well-meaning group of voters, although
adding in enough additional voters, each of whom is more likely to be right than wrong, will
DEMOCRACY
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tion is that a jury system that employed a jury of fifty would do much
better than one that deployed a jury of six - and dramatically so if (as
is common) there is a supermajority rule in place and the larger group
is able to satisfy that rule.23
eventually improve the stew. It is where a non-expert is more likely to be wrong than right,
or where a non-expert does no better than guess, that we most need experts.
Thus, if only to date this Article, the audience in the television program "Who Wants to
be a Millionaire" offers a remarkably reliable "lifeline" for contestants. When this audience
agrees on an answer it is rarely wrong. In the program, there is a "right" answer, there is no
way of discerning experts except that the contestant knows his own doubts and non
expertise, there is no incentive for the jurors to vote strategically, and the nature of the ques
tions and audience suggests that indeed each member is more likely than not to be right.
23. Many readers will wish to know how quickly groups converge on the Condorcet Jury
Theorem's result. How much better are fifty than twelve, or nine judges rather than one, and
so forth? The question is harder mathematically than it first appears. If we ask how quickly
(as the number of voters grows) a majority of a group is very likely to be correct when each
individual voter is but barely likely to be correct, the answer is not quickly at all. Thus, fif
teen voters raise the likelihood of correctness from .51 (for each voter) to .5309; jumping
ahead to judges (for whom the Jury Theorem may sometimes or arguably be applicable),
there may not be much support on this ground for the common idea that supreme courts,
which use simple majority rules, should have six (or two or four) more members than inter
mediate appellate courts. It takes many more voters to do much better, and even if each
voter is .6 or .7 likely to be right, a few more voters do not add terribly much with simple
majority rule. See Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates and Democracy: Some Exten
sions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in INFORMATION POOLING AND
GROUP DECISION MAKING 173, 176 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986). It
goes almost without saying, however, that a few more voters, or judges, might be desirable
for political or deliberative or diversity reasons, or it might simply put an expert in the
group, at least with respect to most subjects likely to be encountered. These sorts of reasons
for expanding the number of judges, committee members, or other voters are excluded from
the Condorcet Jury Theorem's domain.
The group approach is more attractive when we abide by a supermajority or unanimous
decision. When each of three jurors is .51 likely to be correct, and they all agree, there is a
.5299 chance that they are all correct rather than all incorrect. (If each were .6 likely to be
correct, it would be much more likely, on the order of .77, that if they all agree they are all
correct.) It is a Bayesian question of the form "if each voter and potential voter is .51 likely
to be correct and we observe three voters agreeing (which is itself only slightly more than a
.25 chance), how likely is it that these agreeing voters are all correct rather than all incor
rect?" For three jurors, we have p'/( p3 + (1-p)'), where p is the chance that each voter is cor
rect rather than not. See Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen, Condorcet Models, Avenues
for Future Research, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 93, 98
(Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986). As the number of voters increases, and
as the likelihood that each is correct increases, the chance that the supermajority is correct
increases - but of course the likelihood that they are unanimous or nearly so decreases.
Twelve like-minded jurors, each .51 likely to be right, are .6178 likely to be correct, but the
probability that they will all agree in the first place is very small, less than .01. If we ask for a
supermajority of 9/12, the likelihood of gaining a supermajority is .1469, and the likelihood
that this supermajority is right is .5658. And if each juror is .6 likely to be correct, they are
.24 likely to form an agreeable supermajority, and will then have a .9365 chance of being cor
rect. If we seek a supermajority of five out of a group of six jurors, each .6 likely to be cor
rect, we have a .2742 chance of agreement and then a .8506 chance of correctness. (We must
add the chance of a correct 516 agreement with that of a correct unanimous, 6/6, agreement:
(p'+ 6p' (l-p))/(p' + (1-p)'+6p' (l-p) + 6(1-p)'p), where p is, once again, the chance that each
voter is correct.)
But of course these numbers should appeal only to the purist, as they are misleading. In
reality, when supermajority or unanimity rules are in place, and especially when they are
symmetrical as between the parties, the voters are encouraged to deliberate and to reach a
verdict. It is hardly the case that 99 out of 100 twelve-person juries generate mistrials when

736

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:723

But now what if a very large jury assessed the likelihood that the
requirements for liability have been met as .7 and .6, respectively? Is it
not possible that if a single factfinder or a small jury did so we ought to
be comfortable applying the product rule on our way to finding that
.42 was less than what the POE rule required, but that when a large
group does so we should somehow think it more likely that they are
right on both counts? The easiest version of this argument focuses on
a psychological and behavioral question. It is quite plausible that
members of a large jury have little inkling of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem so that they do not appreciate the added value of their own
agreement. If every juror reacts to evidence of defendant's negligence
with an individual assessment that this is .6 likely, it seems plausible if
not certain that this jury would report a unanimous .6 assessment (if
asked for a number). But we would know (by way of the Jury Theo
rem) that these well-meaning jurors failed to appreciate the combined
power of their assessments. Had we asked each whether the assess
ment of negligence should be .6 or more, all would have responded af
firmatively, and it is reasonable to think that every juror is more likely
than not to get this question right. If each juror thinks that .6 is a good
assessment of the first requirement, and .7 is a good assessment of the
second, then the large jury's overall chance of being right, as to the
questions of negligence (or not) and causation (or not), may be quite
high with respect to each question. The product rule is still correct, to
be sure, but the product rule yields a number almost surely closer to
1.0 than to .42.24
bound by a unanimity rule. Without some excellent theory and evidence as to how such
compromise verdicts (if they are that) are reached, it will be impossible to assess our confi
dence in the correctness of the results.
Finally, note that the discussion sets aside such things as the possibility that six jurors
would pay more attention to the evidence than would the fifty because of a kind of collective
action problem. But this sort of claim takes aim at the basic assumptions of the Jury Theo
rem, because it raises the possibility that each member of a small group is significantly more
likely to be right than each member of a large group.

24. I hesitate to say that the probability approaches 1 .0 because of the problem, see
Grofman & Owen, supra note 23, that in reality this unanimous group may have compro
mised or impatiently emerged with a unanimous decision. In any event, the text avoids some
nuances that are not central to the argument. Thus, I ignore the possibility that voters know
when to abstain; it is possible that an advantage of large-group decisionmaking is that those
who know that they are clueless abstain, while the remaining voters do better because they
are more expert. I also avoid questions that are not posed in binary form. We can ask as
many jurors as we like to add .25 and .6, and the fact that most if not all give answers of .85
does not make the right answer 1.0. The Jury Theorem is best framed as dealing with binary
questions, such as guilt (under some standard) or not, liability or not, and so forth. If we ask
jurors whether the sum of .25 and .6 is more likely to be .85 or 1 .0, and each is more likely
than not to get such an addition problem right, then with a likelihood approaching 1 .0 the
group will vote for .85. StiJI, framing can turn many questions into binary form. If we want an
assessment of negligence, we can ask a jury whether a defendant is more than .5 likely to
have behaved negligently. If there is an affirmative answer we can then ask whether it is
more than .6 likely, and so forth. But for the most part we avoid confusion if we are careful
with the part of the Jury Theorem that requires that each voter be more likely than not to
get the question right.
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This link between the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the product
rule might serve to explain law's disinclination to instruct factfinders
according to that basic rule of probability. If juries systematically un
derassess their ability to find facts, then they might well multiply their
average or individual assessments rather than the improved findings of
the group. In some sense this argument is like the familiar reaction
dismissed above in Section l.B.3., that the product rule is suppressed
because of misuse and abuse by factfinders or attorneys. Here the
·misuse claim is that juries would take the product of two (or more)
numbers that are lower than the numbers that they ought to use. They
should, in a sense, be good Bayesians, asking, for instance, what the
chances are that one factfinder who finds a .6 likelihood of negligence
would be wrong about the presence of negligence given that eleven
other jurors have found the same thing. But inasmuch as this is diffi
cult to understand and carry out, it is quite plausible that law does bet
ter leaving out the product rule rather than including it in its instruc
tions to finders of fact.25 This is not to say that lawmakers do this
consciously; the evolutionary process of law may be mysterious, but
this sort of explanation or rationalization follows a long tradition of
positive theorizing.
This explanation of the math-law divide is, of course, more power
ful the larger the jury. It will not, for example, allow us to say much
about panels of three judges who decide cases on appeal - even when
we are satisfied that these judges are searching for a correct answer,
and not injecting preferences, predictable expertise, and so forth.
These panels, discussed in Section III.C. below, raise questions that
are comparable to those raised by factfinding because appeals often
Still, framing can make the Theorem's applicability a slippery question. Imagine that the
evidence suggests that A was negligent in injuring B, but that one witness thought that B has
a preexisting condition such that it was possible, perhaps 10% or 20% likely that A did not
cause B's injury. If this witness was perfectly credible, all the jurors might simply share the
view that A was negligent and that A probably caused B's harm. Additional jurors or voters
will simply confirm the reaction to the defense witness but it will not raise the probability of
getting it all right to 1.0. For the purpose of this Article, however, I think it more than suffi
cient to say that large juries or large supermajorities can often raise our confidence level
above what any one juror thinks. I will be careful not to insist that this increase is to the limit
- but I do think it is fair to say that without the benefit of the Condorcet Jury Theorem we
would underestimate the power of group decisionmaking.
25. It is possible that thinking of this sort is at the root of the argument in Neil Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 399 (1985)
that subjective assessments of probabilities by factfinders
are more properly analogized to probabilities from sample data rather than complete infor
mation. One claim is that:
-

Not only must factfinders determine that their best estimate of the probability in question
exceeds the threshold level - 0.5 for the preponderance of the evidence standard - based
on the evidence presented, but they also must have a certain level of confidence that the true
probability, based on all possible evidence, exceeds that threshold.

Id. But Cohen says nothing about the number of factfinders, and indeed the argument might
be about a single assessor.
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deal with multiple issues, all of which must be decided one way to
support a given disposition or legal remedy. Thus, a panel of judges
might be deciding whether a claimant has standing even as it hears ar
guments about whether substantive law supports the claim. The fa
miliar conjunctive question arises, albeit in slightly different form,
when we ask what such a panel - or any single judge on it - should
do if it thinks that there is a .6 chance that the (best or constitutional
or inherited) law provides for standing and a .7 chance that the claim
ant should (if standing is found) succeed as a matter of substantive
law. For now, it is easy to anticipate a conclusion offered in Part III
below with the point that the Condorcet Jury Theorem argument de
veloped here may be extremely attractive for referenda involving
thousands of voters26 and for truly unanimous juries (of even small
size), somewhat useful for juries of twelve - but quite useful when
these juries reach true supermajority decisions, and of little use for
panels of three judges or for other small juries that can decide matters
with simple majority votes.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to note that the argument offered
here may be offset by the well-known tendency of people to be sticky
and even overconfident (if expert) in their initial judgments.27 If an in
dividual juror is initially offered evidence that suggests likelihoods of
.6 and .7, it is possible that the individual will overestimate his confi
dence in the two results and also discount contradictory evidence; de
liberation might polarize or deepen individual convictions, and indi
viduals might discount evidence or arguments that contradict their
first impressions, while accepting that which confirms first impres
sions. The overconfident juror may then report likelihoods greater
than .6 and . 7. Taken alone, this danger (or bias if it is really that)
might intensify the mystery of the math-law divide because overconfi
dence might be nicely offset by instructions to multiply one's (over
confident) assessments.28 But taken together with the argument of
fered here about the Condorcet Jury Theorem, it is possible to say that
a group of jurors might individually assess likelihoods as satisfying the
preponderance rule, that they might be overconfident in their assess
ments, but that they might not recognize the power of additional
judgments submitted by fellow jurors. Whether one of these effects
dominates is difficult to know without careful - and even then only
26. Though it should be noted that statutes or constitutions permitting plebiscites, refer
enda, or other exercises in direct democracy sometimes limit the problem by imposing a sin
gle-subject requirement on these popular votes. See generally James D. Gordon III & David
B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 298, 303 (1989).
27. See Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confir
matory Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37 (1999).
28. And it is unlikely that the overconfidence bias would generate a corresponding need
in the opposite direction.
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suggestive - empirical testing. It should be easy to get an idea of test
subjects' abilities to internalize the Condorcet Jury Theorem, but so
far as I know there is no work on this question of self-centered bi
ases.29
In any event, I can do no more than be suggestive with these occa
sional remarks about connections between the arguments offered here
and the psychology literature on various biases. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem works with individual assessments; we know something
about what happens when individuals deliberate in groups before ren
dering their decisions, but there is much that we do not know. My fo
cus is on aggregation issues and how they relate to the product rule. I
can only hope that my suggestions will complement insights regarding
the psychology of group decisionmaking.
C.

Aggregation and Juries

This Section offers an additional theory to explain (or perhaps to
understand or simply to rationalize) where it is that we suppress the
product rule.30 This theory may complement the Jury Theorem dis29. More generally, it would be useful to know more about the relative strength of the
confirmatory and self-confidence biases. It would be interesting to see how juries reacted to
hearing first from one side or the other (because the confirmatory bias suggests that there is
an advantage in going first) and to hearing warnings about the bias itself. But these topics
are beyond the scope of this Article. I aim to make discrete points about the Jury Theorem,
the likely views of inframarginal jurors (especially where there are supermajority require
ments), and the product rule. I refer to these perception biases in order to remind readers
and author alike that there is much more going on than what is discussed in this Article.
30. A different approach would be to work in reverse and to be more interested in the
selection of a voting rule than in the suppression of the product rule. The same set of obser
vations can be used to explain the location of supermajority voting rules. We might eliminate
uses of supermajoritarianism that appear to take the place of bicameralism, other confeder
ating devices, or "brakes" on faction-supported government intervention, and then ask
whether other instances of supermajority requirements can be linked to multiple require
ments and hence the (suppression of the) product rule. On the relationship among these
tools, see Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT L
REV. L. & ECON. 145 (1992). We might be able to explain the disinclination to assess things
more directly (and calculate their product) with our observations about strategic voting.
This is obviously not the place for such an exhaustive exercise, but it may be useful to
point out that we virtually never find a supermajority requirement in committees. Closer to
home, law faculties often work with supermajority requirements for personnel matters, and
often not. These supermajorities can be explained, I think, but not in ways that have much to
do with the product rule.
In my own experience in academic settings, simple majority voting has been associated
with a wonderful and remarkably low level of strategic voting. Participants seemed to act as
if they understood the genius of the Jury Theorem. Some of the most respected faculty
members were often, as far as I could tell, perfectly content to "lose" and to abide happily by
the majority. My other, shorter experience has been with serious supermajoritarianism. It
too functions remarkably well. I might explain the rule as amounting to fairly explicit defer
ence to experts - in keeping with the Jury Theorem after all. Alternatively, every faculty
personnel matter can be seen as a difficult question of agenda-setting because one does not
know what future appointment is foreclosed by a current appointment. A large and enthusi
astic supermajority makes it quite likely that the future candidate will not be preferred to the
present one.
'
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cussed above, but may also apply when the conditions necessary for
the application of the Jury Theorem do not obtain.
As Sections C.1 and C.2 explain, when the majority of a group
agrees that a given threshold (such as POE) has been met, we can
normally reason that the standard has been exceeded by a significant
amount, especially where a supermajority voting requirement is util
ized. Thus, suppression of the product rule following aggregation is of
ten harmless. Section C.3 examines the rationale behind suppressing
the product rule even in cases involving two (or more) theories of li
ability, and Section C.4 discusses the suppression of the rule in cases at
the other extreme, involving a single theory with a single requirement.
Finally, Section C.5 addresses the lingering question of why the prod
uct rule may not be used openly. Namely, it may be very difficult to
employ the product rule directly, especially if jurors are inclined to
ward strategic voting. Accordingly, where law uses sizeable and su
permajority juries it is perhaps explicable (and even desirable) that
law suppresses the fundamental intuition of the product rule.
1.

Aggregation of Non-Identical Views (and the Product Rule)

If we ask a jury for a numerical response, it is obvious that this
group of respondents may have difficulty agreeing on a single an
swer.31 One possibility is to poll the jurors and aggregate their re
sponses through some method decided by law. Another is to instruct
the jurors as to how they should aggregate. And the third likely
method is to allow the jury to aggregate as it chooses. Jumping ahead
of the argument - partly in the interest of appealing to readers from
jurisdictions that do not use juries for this sort of thing - it should be
noted that panels of judges can be substituted for jurors in most of this
discussion, and the idea of allowing the group to aggregate on its own
may amount to a version of "outcome" as opposed to "issue" voting, a
choice discussed below.32
Perhaps the simplest form of my argument in this Section can be
made by beginning with the case where jurors are asked for a final an
swer, so that in effect they are instructed to aggregate on their own
and without much guidance. Consider, in other words, the approxi
mate instruction given to most American juries in tort cases: "Tell the
court by a unanimous (or supermajority33) verdict whether it is more
31. Strategic behavior problems are discussed infra Section II.C.5.
32. Put differently, simultaneous - as opposed to sequential - decisionmaking can
lead to interesting anomalies. See infra Section III.B.
33. Roughly speaking, more than a third of the states require unanimity in civil cases,
see, e.g., CONN. SUPER. Cr. R. 16-30; S.C. R. Civ. P. 48. (South Carolina). States sometimes
relax the unanimity requirement, however, once juries have deliberated for some hours. See
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.17 (1999); IOWA R. CIV. P. 203. Moreover, in many states the
parties can opt out of the unanimity rule by agreeing on another decision rule.
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likely than not that defendant was negligent and tell us also whether
this negligence caused plaintiff's injury. If you answer both questions
affirmatively, we will ask for your help with respect to damages."
Imagine that there are twelve jurors and that nine (or more) agree
that yes, it is more likely than not that there was negligence and the
requisite causation. I refer to this as an agreement that the probability
of defendant's negligence exceeds .5, and that the likelihood of the
relevant causation also exceeds that important number. In fact, let us
imagine the worst-case scenario from the perspective of the math-law
divide. The supermajority informs the court that in fact it has just
barely reached the decision it reported.34 Nine jurors are willing to
vote that there is at least a .51 chance of negligence and nine are will
ing to vote that there is at least a .51 chance of causation, and all the
jurors believe that the two likelihoods are independent. The product
rule encourages us to find that imposing liability here would be lawless
because the conjunctive probability may be on the order of only .26.35
But it is easy to imagine that each supermajority group of nine36 in
corporated individual assessments ranging from just over .5 all the way
to 1.0. Just as a majority vote for candidate X in a general election is
likely to mean that some voters barely prefer X over the alternatives
while some very much prefer X, a vote for (as opposed to against) the
.51 response is likely to mean that some voters are at .6 or .75 or even
1.0 (or indeed at .51 for that matter). In the absence of additional in
formation about the actual distribution, we might even proceed ama
teurishly and recklessly, and hazard a guess that the average assess
ment of this group of nine is .75, halfway between the marginal .51
Among the states that do not require unanimity, about half call for an 80% supermajor
ity (by requiring agreement of either ten of twelve or five of six jurors, depending on the jury
size), many ask for a three-quarters supermajority, and a few permit two-thirds supermajori
ties. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4113 (2001} (five of six); WIS. STAT. § 805.09 (1999} (five of
six); CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 618 (2000} (three-fourths rule}; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13 (three
fourths rule}; MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-7-403 (West 2000} (two-thirds rule); Mo. CONST. art.
1, § 22(a) (two-thirds rule in courts not of record}. There is some variety as to jury size, so
that a greater percentage might be required for a smaller jury. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60248(g) (West 1999); LA. CODE Civ. P. ANN. art. 1797 (West 2000). The supermajority char
acter of the argument offered here is emphasized in the next Section of the text.
34. For expository purposes, I set aside the question of whether the presiding judge
permits the jury to convey this information.
35. The language in the text reflects the fact that apart from rare (and perhaps nonexist
ent) cases with special verdicts as to the jury's precise judgment, we have not received a .51
response but rather an affirmative answer to the question of whether each requirement is
met by the POE standard, which is to say is more than .5 likely. More generally, it should be
noted that special verdicts of the kind observed do not much affect the analysis here. Juries
simply tell us that multiple requirements are met (one at a time); they are not encouraged to
take the products of probabilities. Nor, of course, does the discussion here suggest that they
ought to be so encouraged.
36. The argument here is largely unaffected by the question of whether the majority on
one question is different from that supporting the other. Strategic problems aside (for now),
it should matter little.
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vote and the ceiling offered by 1.0. If we apply the product rule, then
.75 times .75 is about .56, exceeding the .5 marker of the POE rule.37
I intend to deal with several problems, or unsubtle steps, in this
quick example, but it is worth emphasizing the straightforward point
by dropping the artificial device of the jury having reported its precise
.51 breakpoint. If the jury merely responds to the most familiar ques
tion that is asked of it, agreeing that the necessary majority has voted
that each requirement for liability is more likely than not to be present
then, as we have just seen, our sloppy estimate of what a majority of
this jury thinks might be .75, but there is surely not much of a case for
something as low as .51. Indeed, our best estimate is undoubtedly
higher than before, now that the jury has not saddled us with precise
information about the marginal voter. We know now that the marginal
member of the majority must be at .51 or greater. And, again, if nine
of the twelve report two independent and successive more-likely-than
not findings, it is more than plausible that a fair application of the
product rule would produce a conjunctive probability of greater than,
if not significantly greater than, .5.
In short, there is a neat explanation for the math-law divide where
multiple decisionmakers are concerned because the aggregation proc
ess passes over information that would have suggested higher numeri
cal assessments.38 The mathematician is not generally asked about an
aggregation issue, so that in fact there is no inconsistency between the
mathematician's and lawyer's intuitions. When a group decides that
two things are more likely than not, the members of the group are on
average likely to be much more confident than an individual re
sponding with two more-likely-than-not assessments. If we were to
apply the product rule, we would need a great deal of information
from this group (as emphasized presently). And if our choice is either
to apply the product rule to those numbers that a majority of the vot
ers' assessments exceed or to avoid the product rule entirely, we are
very likely to do better by avoiding the product rule.
It is of course possible to imagine cases in which suppressing the
product rule will be indefensible on the above reasoning. Imagine, for
example, that three jurors regard negligence as 0.0 likely and nine re-

37. I do not mean to hazard a guess as to the distribution of assessments. But given that
unanimity and 80% supermajority requirements are so common, a calculation of the sort
sketched here is quite defensible.
38. Perhaps I should say "more intense assessments" because the jury's report will, in
like fashion, suppress information that would have suggested a lower numerical assessment
when the jury finds that a requirement is less likely than not to be present. The math-law
divide, however, is only an issue where multiple requirements are all (individually) assessed
as satisfying the standard for liability.
Note that the explanation offered here does not depend on the Jury Theorem and there
fore, unlike the argument advanced in Section 11.B, it is not open to claims that the assump
tions of that theorem are absent.
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gard negligence as .51 likely, and that the same is true for causation.
Setting aside the possibility of compromise, the jury will report that
the POE standard is satisfied for both requirements, and we will wish
that we used the product rule to discourage a finding of liability.39 But
this sort of distribution is probably unlikely, and the cases against the
product rule surely outnumber those that beg for it. Lawyers are ac
customed to overinclusive rules and explanations.
2.

Supermajority Requirements

Supermajority requirements obviously play an important role in
these arguments about aggregation and conjunction. With a 7-5 vote
we might reason that the negative voters' assessments offset the infra
marginal affirmative voters, and that our swing voter is likely to be
close to the cutoff that the jury instructions inquired into. But with a 93 or 12-0 supermajority, we might have confidence that the median ju
ror (or any other information used to derive our best estimate of the
facts) is well above the announced cutoff. Put this way, supermajority
voting can be seen as an alternative to, or as inconsistent with, the
product rule. If a supermajority finds that negligence is more likely
than not, and that causation is as well, we might regard our best esti
mates of each as closer to .75 than .5; with two requirements, the sup
pression of the product rule may not vitiate the finding of liability by a
supermajority.
I have already implied that our best estimate of a likelihood will
take dissenters' views into account; it is this intuition that makes a su
permajority look quite different from a simple majority decision that
something is (or is not) more likely than not. Imagine, for example,
that we could poll the jury and find that we have four jurors respond
ing to questions about negligence and causation with likelihoods of .3,
four at .6, and four at .9. A majority, and for that matter a two-thirds
supermajority, will respond affirmatively to the preponderance of the
evidence questions. If we look only at this majority, then we are com
fortable suppressing the product rule because it is hard to justify any
thing far from a .75 estimate, and two such independent probabilistic
assessments survive the product rule. But of course we have four ju
rors weighing in at .3, and the very intuitions advanced thus far suggest
that our best estimates should count those views as well, in which case
39. The only saving grace of the law's suppression of the product rule (as I will continue
to call it) comes from the Jury Theorem. If nine million jurors thought .51 and three million
thought 0.0, then following the Condorcet Jury Theorem we might be quite confident in the
.51. Certainly if the supermajority multitude thought .7 and the minority thought 0.0, we
would be comfortable with liability (even though (.7)(.7) is less than .5). But I am trying to
set aside this argument from the Jury Theorem against the simple application of the product
rule in part because we can do better and in part because we do not deploy juries of huge
populations.
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we find ourselves at .6 for each requirement, and with a product below
that required by the POE rule.40
In this example, a rule requiring a three-quarters supermajority
will prove convenient. In the absence of compromise, the jury will fall
one short of the necessary supermajority and there will be no liability.
Generally speaking, when a supermajority of a reasonably sized jury
responds affirmatively to the POE questions it is asked to consider, we
can guess that the median and mean of the entire jury are well above
.5 for each question. This gives us reason to be fairly comfortable with
a system that suppresses the product rule and asks only whether a su
permajority believes the POE standard has been met for each ques
tion. Two affirmative answers from such a supermajority will normally
mean that had we enjoyed the luxury of actual assessments, and had
we applied the product rule, the POE standard would also have been
satisfied. Moreover, if the alternative is to ask a different, single, yes
or no question, namely whether a majority or supermajority agrees to
(at least) a specific probabilistic assessment, we will do worse. I return
to this idea presently.
I do not mean to overstate the fit between the rather common
unanimity (or high supermajority) requirement, where juries are used,
and the absence of a product rule. The connection is a coarse one.
Without careful empirical work regarding instructions, jury reversals,
and the like, it would be reckless (and surely incorrect) to claim rather
wishfully that there is more suppression of the product rule with larger
juries. As far as I can tell, the product rule is suppressed with super
majority juries of six and eight just as it is with unanimous groups of
twelve.41 Still, it is not entirely reckless to suggest that it would not be

40. In some situations we might choose to discard outliers, but again we would do so at
both ends of the spectrum. Apart from problems associated with asking jurors for specific
assessments (rather than yes or no responses to the POE question), see infra Section II.C.5,
an added problem here is that jurors may be strategic in their attempts not to be dismissed as
outliers.
The discussion in this Section sets aside the Jury Theorem's insight that multiple judg
ments, in sync with one another, are better than one. Put slightly differently, although the
Jury Theorem itself might be the reason why we abide by majorities, there is no reason to
throw out the information provided by the putative minority, so long as the question is nei
ther binary nor one that commands an absolute majority for a single position (but rather is
the kind of question considered here, where we really want a point estimate).
41. There seems to be little relationship between the size and decision rule of a state's
juries and the degree to which the product rule is suppressed. Thus, New Hampshire re
quires a unanimous verdict from a twelve-person jury, but its sample jury instructions are
rather ambiguous regarding the product rule: "The plaintiff claims: [State essential elements
of the claim, making reference to time, place and circumstances) . . . These are the issues
which are to be determined by you based on the facts as you find them to be and by applying
the law as the court instructs you." N.H. Clv. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.1 (1999). Michigan
permits a verdict from five out of six jurors, but the product rule is suppressed in the sample
jury instructions: "The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following proposi
tions: a. that the plaintiff [was injured I sustained damage); b. that the defendant was negli
gent in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiff, as stated to you in these instruc-
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easy to incorporate the product rule into jury decisionmaking, that se
vere supermajority jury rules are surprisingly common, that superma
jority responses to POE questions are likely to reflect assessments that
are further from .5 than first meets the eye, and, finally, that with such
numbers we might worry less about the suppression of the product
rule.
3.

Alternative Routes Revisited

Any rationalization for the suppression of the product rule must
also seek to explain the suppression in cases involving alternative
theories of liability (and so forth) and cases involving a single re
quirement. (Single requirement cases are discussed in the next Sec
tion.) In the case of alternative theories of liability, the product rule
would favor the plaintiff. The issue for the jury becomes not whether
any one of the alternative theories has been established, but whether it
is more likely than not that not a single one of the alternative condi
tions has been met. If the plaintiff wins by showing one or more of W,
D, and M, for example, and the jury responds that the likelihood of
each is .5 or less, we might imagine (sloppily) that they really "agree"
on .45 and that our best guess is .4 for each if only because the Jury
Theorem gives us some added confidence. In this illustration the like
lihood that all three causes of action fall in defendant's favor is
(.6)(.6)(.6) .216, and perhaps plaintiff should win.42 We might worry
that the suppression of the product rule has unfairly denied plaintiff's
recovery because the chances are that defendant is liable because of W
or D or M, even though the jury does not think that any one alone is
more likely than not.43
Once again, however, we have not yet taken into account the
spread of the jury's assessments and the question of how to aggregate
diverse reactions to the evidence. If the jurors assessments are spread
or concentrated far below the .5 divide (about which they were
polled), and these likelihoods are independent, then it is possible that
plaintiff should still lose and that once again the supermajority rule
can be seen as a substitute for the product rule. Thus, if our best
guesses are not .45 but rather, say, .3 for W, .2 for D, and .1 for M,
then the likelihood that D succeeds in defending against all three
grounds argued by plaintiff at once is (.7)(.8)(.9) .504. Plainly, when
a large supermajority says that each of two or more alternative re
quirements is less likely than not to be met, our best guesses might be
=

=

tions; c. that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the [injuries I dam
ages) to the plaintiff." MICH. STD. CIV. JuRY INSTRUCTIONS 16.02 (1998).
42. Similarly, if we had imagined agreement on .25, then (.75)(.75)(.75)=.422.
43. See supra note 11, where D,

M,

and W are given concrete form.
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well below the .5 cutoff so that again the product rule's suppression
may do no harm.
4.

Single Requirement Cases

If aggregation and conjunction are indeed somehow or even sensi
bly connected through the idea of thinking about inframarginal jurors
and what they say about our best assessments of likelihoods, then we
need to revisit familiar cases where there is no issue of conjunction. If
a jury is asked but one question, and most or all voters agree that the
answer satisfies some standard such as POE or even reasonable doubt,
then it is likely, as we have seen, that our best assessment is much
more confident than is first apparent.
And yet the supermajority rule is not relaxed when a jury is asked
but one question. If we observed a legal system that asked for unani
mous jury verdicts only where multiple (independent) questions were
posed or only in areas of law, such as torts, where multiple questions
are common, it would be much more obvious that there was a connec
tion between conjunction and aggregation.
Imagine, for example, that a judge asks a jury whether defendant
has more likely than not given an inadequate warning. Imagine further
that there is no other jury question; perhaps all else is stipulated, or
perhaps there is a fine or liability rule associated with an inadequate
warning. If all jurors respond affirmatively, we know (compromise and
Condorcet aside) that the marginal juror is somewhere above .5 but
that the average juror is likely to be at some point significantly higher
than .5. But if so, perhaps our rule is too restrictive. After all, if we
have some faith in the Jury Theorem and we like the POE rule in civil
cases, as I think we should44, and seven of twelve jurors are above .5,
and the mean response is above .5, then why not prefer liability where
that result is supported by a majority but not a required supermajor
ity?
The preceding question can be reformulated in a number of ways.
One is to ask why we like supermajority decisions in the first place.
Another, more formidable construction, asks how we justify super
majority or even unanimous decisions for juries while abiding by sim
ple majorities in the very same cases when issues are reviewed by pan
els of appellate judges. The larger question, about why and where we
require supermajorities, is a topic saved for another day.45
For present purposes, one fairly safe argument should suffice. It is
that we might require supermajorities in order to encourage some care
on the parts of jurors. If juries knew that simple majority decisions
44. See Levmore, supra 12.
45. See Saul Levmore, More Than Mere Majorities, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 759 (forthcom
ing 2001) (manuscript at 13-16, on file with author).
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were acceptable, they might retire to the jury room and impatiently
poll the group and (absent a tie vote) decide that their job was done. If
there is some value to considering evidence that one missed the first
time, to hearing others' observations, and to concentrating on the mat
ter at hand, then a supermajority requirement may be an elegant
means of forcing such steps. One can barely imagine a legal system
that encouraged a judge to tell the jury that it needs a supermajority
verdict where there are multiple (or, as we will see, alternative) re
quirements, but that it might reach a simple majority verdict after due
deliberation where there is but one requirement or factual question.46
But there are reasons to suggest that we not eliminate the super
majority requirement for single requirement cases. Most important is
the possibility that the category of concern, consisting of single re
quirement Uury) cases, is exceedingly small. Most tort cases will have
the jury deciding negligence and causation and more. Most contract
cases will also require the jury to consider a number of requirements
because of the various available defenses. The plaintiff might win a
case if the defendant failed to deliver goods as promised and such de
livery would not have been impossible (or otherwise excused) and the
plaintiff mitigated in a reasonable manner, and so forth. In most areas
of law, when we rely on juries, we give them multiple questions and we
await a series of (somewhat) independent assessments before impos
ing liability or finding guilt. As such, the number of cases where we
might be tempted to tell our judges to instruct juries to abide by a
simple majority rule simply because the jury is asked but a single ques
tion may well be quite small.47 It is easy to imagine that judges who
were empowered to instruct juries to switch to simple majority deci
sion rules would so overuse this tool as to make things worse rather
than better.
Another way to rationalize the use of supermajorities - and espe
cially unanimity requirements - even where single requirements are
issue, is to make some reasonable assumptions about the process of
jury compromise. If ten jurors think that plaintiff has satisfied the sin46. Deliberation might also explain a supermajority rule quite generally, but then aggre
gation considerations are needed to understand the math-law divide.

47. Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify this conjecture. In a large fraction of jury
verdict cases, reasonable people might disagree as to whether the jury had been asked one or
multiple independent questions. There is difficulty in assessing whether a jury deliberated
and voted on multiple requirements (or a single one) and there is also difficulty in assessing
whether these multiple questions would (or should) have been regarded as independent. A
random sample of jury verdicts reported in Jury Verdicts Weekly (Jan.-Mar. 1996), for exam
ple, suggests that, in about 30% of cases, jurors must decide on two or more independent,
contested elements. In another 20% of the cases, it is clear that jurors are only asked to de
cide one issue, either because one or more issues are stipulated or not seriously contested or
because the case involved but one issue. But in the remaining 50% of the sample cases, it is
not clear whether the jury is deciding one issue or more. These cases ostensibly involve mul
tiple elements, but often they are interdependent, as when multiple issues depend on the
credibility of a single witness.
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gle POE requirement, but two jurors insist on assessments of .4, for
example, then it is possible that the two will give in to the ten - in the
interest of consensus or in the face of a unanimity rule - but expect to
influence the group to award lower damages than might otherwise
seem to have been caused by the defendant. Put differently, super
majority requirements may be relaxed by potential dissenters who are
influenced by the cultural and democratic norm in favor of simple
majority rule, or even who intuit the Jury Theorem. Of course, the
more this is so, the less confident we can be that a supermajority reac
tion to a POE question reflects an assessment that is much above or
below .5.48
In any event, the most ambitious form of the positive argument
advanced here is that the supermajority voting rule in juries takes the
place of the product rule where multiple requirements are concerned.
We might begin with the danger of simple majority rules and juries
rushing to judgment, in which case we prefer supermajorities and then
suppress the product rule "because" we would otherwise dramatically
overassess likelihoods. Alternatively, we might begin the description
with the suppression of the product rule on grounds of math anxiety or
strategic behavior,49 and then conceive of the supermajority require
ment as a substitute for the product rule. Either way, the argument is
most powerful if most cases do involve questions for conjunction.
5.

The Problem of Strategic Behavior

I have repeatedly deferred or even avoided the question of why we
do not simply ask all the jurors for their best, precise assessments.
Note that we have no reason to ask unless there are multiple (and
somewhat independent) requirements for liability so that we might
wish to use the product rule. In any event, if jurors could and would
answer this sort of question sincerely, which is to say without an eye
on the aggregate result, we might do much better than we can hope to
do by asking multiple POE, yes or no, questions while suppressing the
product rule. And it goes almost without saying that, at least following
the argument developed here, we should overcome the math-law di-

48. The blending of views into a single number is a useful reminder of the sort of process
explored here. If a supermajority agrees on liability but the jurors then discovered, for ex
ample, that their damage assessments differ and range from one hundred thousand dollars to
one million dollars, I think we would be startled to hear that they could not come to agree
on a "unanimous" verdict if required to do so. And it would seem unlikely that our best
guess as to their compromise or unanimous verdict would be one hundred thousand dollars.
We expect verdicts to reflect the mean or median voter, more or less - and for strategic be
havior reasons we are unlikely to wish it were otherwise - and that is why supermajority
verdicts (especially) might not require much in the way of application of the product rule.
49. See supra. Section l.B.5; infra Section II.C.5.
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vide and apply the product rule when appropriate to these precise re
sponses.
One reason we do not ask for precise probabilistic assessments, but
prefer instead the "does it satisfy the POE standard (or not)" ques
tion, followed by the same question with regard to the next require
ment for liability, is no doubt that we appreciate the level of math
anxiety present in the population of jurors (not to mention judges).
For obvious reasons, I do not dwell on this easy explanation, though I
must admit it as a serious explanation. Cutting against it is the fact that
we do ask identical panels to decide damages where they have found
liability, and these damage calculations require much more than yes or
no (or greater or lesser) responses. They call for estimates, extrapola
tions, present values, and so forth.
The second and more trying reason is, I think, that we correctly
hesitate to enable strategic behavior by jurors (or judges) because if
such behavior is unevenly distributed, group decisionmaking quickly
loses its appeal.so The problem is especially acute if jurors think that
we are interested in the mean response. If six jurors bear assessments
of .6, and six of .9, then following deliberations1 the mean response is
of course .75 and, if the same is true with regard to the next question,
liability is found even after the product rule is applied. But if even one
member whose own assessments are, say, .6 and .6 sees that the prod
uct rule as applied to his assessments alone suggests that the defendant
be free of liability, and acts upon this by responding strategically with
0.0 to each question, then the mean responses (of .7) will be insuffi
cient to survive the product rule. There is much more that could be
said about successful and unsuccessful strategic behavior here, but I
suspect that most readers will be satisfied with this account (and impa
tient with more).s2 Legal systems prefer to ask voters, and certainly
50. Note that I am not claiming that this strategic behavior leads to perverse results, by
which I mean results that are contrary to what the majority itself prefers. For some devel
opment of this theory, see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 1 49-58
(2000), where there is a claim that most legal and political systems prefer schemes that do
not lend themselves to strategic behavior that can lead to perverse results - which is to say
ex post "dissatisfied majorities." For example, if we allowed people to buy and sell votes, we
might easily find ourselves with a winning candidate that a majority did not wish for (even in
a two candidate election) and that even most intense voters did not prefer. This winner may
have emerged because voters misestimated the likely vote or the likely price of votes. In con
trast, if half a jury assesses negligence (and causation, to make the example quicker) at .6
and half at .9, we know that the wisdom of the group favors liability, even with the product
rule applied. But some of the .6 assessors may see that when they apply the product rule to
their own assessments, the defendant is free of liability. Fearful that other voters will come
up with higher numbers, they might respond with 0 or .1 when polled. But at least they will
be pleased if there is no liability.
51. I do not discuss deliberation here, but it is hard to see why we should prefer to take
these votes without or prior to deliberation. Among other things, deliberation can serve to
bring out "expert" knowledge and assessments which (even) the Jury Theorem bows to.

52. In an important sense, this argument is a close relative of one considered in the mat
ter of "issue" versus "outcome" voting on judicial panels. See Lewis A. Kornhauser &
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voters on juries, simple, manageable questions that do not immedi
ately generate strategic responses. Strategic responses can ruin the
majoritarian exercise. Even limited awareness of the presence of stra
tegic behavior can demoralize the citizenry.
Nor will it do much good to ask the jury to aggregate on its own
and to provide a numerical group assessment. The problem is not in
the court's ability to aggregate without enabling strategic voting, but
rather in the incentive to dissemble under (at least) some aggregation
strategies. If the jury reports its mean assessment, the analysis is much
the same as above.
The trick, then, is to aggregate in a way that is resistant to strategic
voting. One possibility is not to aggregate. Thus, each member might
enter a slip of paper, and the group's assessment will be the assess
ment on the one slip that is pulled from the pile in lottery style. The
advantage of such a scheme is that one may as well be honest.53 But
one disadvantage is that we throw away all that might be gained from
numerous voters.54
A better plan might be to focus on the jury's median response. In
the case of a supermajority requirement this translates into the mar
ginal (as it were) response. If we ask a supermajority whether its level
of confidence exceeds .7,55 the idea being that two such affirmative re
sponses might lead us to think that even with the product rule we are
on safe ground, then there is little if any room for destructive strategic
behavior. A power-hungry juror may be confident in her own assess
ment of .4, but she gains nothing by feigning an assessment greater
than .7. Similarly, a juror who senses from deliberation that her as
sessment is above the median or relevant margin is not offered the
chance to exaggerate, and will hardly gain by giving a dishonest re
sponse. We have simply asked whether individual assessments are
above or below a number. One can influence a mean but not a median
with exaggeration. Eliciting binary responses in this manner eliminates
useful information when the voters are not evenly distributed, but at
least we gain something from the deployment of many voters and we
do not leave the process as open to strategic behavior problems.
I do not wish to abandon these jury issues with the impression that
strategic behavior problems must necessarily drive any positive or
Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L.
REV. l, 55-56 (1993).

53. Unless the problem is that a juror may think that the deterrence or expressive func
tion of Jaw is too far in one direction or the other. In that case, a juror will be extreme and
little influenced by the facts of the particular case.
54. The plan gives up on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in a manner of speaking.
55. If I were not trying to set the Jury Theorem aside, I might say that with numerous
jurors (perhaps twelve), we ought to be satisfied with asking whether their assessments ex
ceeded .6 or even some lower assessment.
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normative analysis of this relationship between aggregation and con
junction issues. Nonetheless, it is useful though perhaps startling to
question the intuition that some jurors might simply like to get their
way, and that strategic behavior will be tempting.
To do this, we need to return to the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
which tells us that when there is a right answer to a question, as op
posed to a matter of preferences or a matter that is pure guesswork (at
least for nonexperts ), each of us should be pleased to have the assis
tance of many other voters. If the majority of my group, and especially
of a large group, votes for X on such a matter, then if I am in the mi
nority and voted for not-X, it would normally be foolish for me to
want to get my way. In these situations, if my goal is to get the ques
tion right or do my civic duty, then I should be pleased to accede to
the majority. In turn, if voters behave as I hope I would, the legal sys
tem can safely use mean juror responses (and need not resort to medi
ans) because the jurors will have no interest in voting strategically.
This is not the place to dwell on this rather abstract and counterin
tuitive argument. It asks us to believe that the legal system reliably
asks jurors to do those tasks for which the Jury Theorem is applicable.
It asks us to believe very little of what is commonly said about jurors
and judges on panels, because a familiar kind of intellectual ambition,
ego gratification, and power grabbing is assumed away.56 These are
difficult steps and yet it is possible that we cannot know what to make
of the product rule or of its suppression without a better understand
ing of when and why jurors and judges vote strategically.
III. AGGREGATION WITH JUDGES
A.

Single Judges and the Product Rule

Some of the analysis in Part II leads to the normative conclusion
that a judge working alone in a bench trial should employ the product
rule. And nearly all of the analysis leads to the positive prediction that
we should find single judges using the product rule. We might expect
this pattern to be subtle, both because of the disinclination to deal ex
plicitly with mathematical and statistical concepts and because judges
might try to parry the inclination of parties to prefer (or avoid) jury
trials in order to avoid (or gain) the product rule.57 Of course, the
56. One reason it is hard to accept the idea that strategic voting may be against self
interest in some settings, is that we do not experience these settings in everyday life. Thus, in
law schools, law firms, and congressional committees, voting is often about matters that re
late to one's preferences - rather than to something that has a "right" answer (and regard
ing which we are unlikely to be expert). But if the Jury Theorem is useful in some domain,
and if actual jury decisions as deployed by courts are included in this domain, then strategic
behavior "should" be less of an issue than is normally thought.
57. Or at least so they might think. In fact, it might be hard to choose between the su
permajority requirement and the single judge.
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more subtle the pattern, the more difficult it is to demonstrate. For the
most part, I leave the subject of bench trials and the product rule for
another day, and especially for a comparative effort.58 This Article
continues to focus on aggregation (and conjunction).
B.

Multimember Panels of Factfinding Judges

A panel of several judges engaged in factfinding is, of course, a
kind of jury. The arguments developed in Part II, however, are some
what dampened with regard to judicial panels. The Jury Theorem ef
fect is less pronounced because judicial panels are normally smaller
than lay juries, and the Jury Theorem is based on the arithmetic of
getting something right with an increasing number of (even marginally
useful) voters. Still, three Qudicial) heads are better than one.59 Of
course, judges might make other errors that jurors do not make. If, for
example, judges as experts working alone suffer from the well-known
overconfidence bias, then the product rule, if applied, may do too little
to correct for this bias.60 If a judge "should" assess two requirements as
.7 and .6 likely, but suffering from an overconfidence bias, prepares to
deploy .9 and .9, multiplying those overconfident assessments will
produce liability where the proper application of the product rule
would not.61
There is some chance of finding that smaller panels operating with
a simple majority rule suppress the product rule less than large ones
bound by supermajority requirements. The experiences of agencies,
commissions, military courts and, of course, jurisdictions that do not
use juries but sometimes use multimember panels of judges can be
combed for this inquiry. But again, this is not yet a comparative enter
prise.
Finally, I should note one normative application of the arguments
developed here. A single judge presiding over a bench trial can pur
chase the advantages of the Jury Theorem, in some fashion, by hearing
58. In American jurisdictions we can look to see whether judges acting alone implicitly
apply the product rule where there are multiple requirements. In most non-American juris
dictions judges generally operate without juries - but then sometimes in panels - so that
comparisons are likely to be especially interesting. But I should warn the reader that I am
not holding back any striking evidence in favor of the broad application of the thesis ad
vanced here. I know of no jurisdiction that explicitly applies the product rule.
59. There would also be opportunity to see a subtle effect when panel decisions were
unanimous. Thus, if a three-judge panel is unanimous in finding two elements of liability, we
might anticipate more subtle suppression of the product rule than if the panel had been di
vided.

60. See supra text accompanying note 26.
61. Nor is this symmetrical. The judge who "should" assess at .4 thinks that the require
ment is less likely than not to be present. The judge will find against liability - and if the
judge is overconfident and subsequently revises the estimate to . 1, the outcome will be the
same.
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from scores of witnesses and experts. A judge who thinks she needs
only to find that two requirements set out by law are more likely than
not to be present might hear from one or two witnesses. But one who
wanted to sign off on .7 or .8 assessments (in order to preserve the
possibility of liability even after multiplying the probabilities attached
to two such assessments) might need to hear from five or ten witnesses
on a matter.62
C.

Appeals Panels

Large portions of the arguments offered in Part II can be extended
to decisions made by panels of judges considering multiple issues on
appeal. There is a small but effective literature on "issue versus out
come voting," but advances in this area are possible, I think, through
some exploration of the relevance of the Jury Theorem and the place
of the product rule (or its suppression).63
Imagine, once again, that there are two requirements for a judg
ment, or at least for a judgment that favors the original plaintiff. Plain
tiff wins if the trial court below was correct in finding not only that this
plaintiff had standing to sue but also that substantive law favored the
plaintiff's position. A majority of the appellate court might have sup
ported the plaintiff on standing, and a different (but obviously over
lapping) majority thinks the lower court was correct in its application
of substantive law in plaintiff's favor. A judge who thought there was
standing but who thought that plaintiff should have lost on the second,
substantive question would on her own have decided against plaintiff
because plaintiff needs both issues in his favor. Thus, if the judges vote
sincerely on issues, one at a time, two distinct majorities produce a vic
tory for plaintiff. But if we ask each judge for a decision as to the out
come of the entire appeal, we will get a different result. Note that if we
choose issue voting, as we generally do not in American law, a given
judge might strategically "change" her vote regarding the first issue in
order to get the overall result she prefers.64
One thing missing in the extant literature is the relevance of a
judge's level of confidence in her judgment. There is little reason to
weigh levels of confidence when a panel is deciding one issue. Delib
eration, deference to expertise, and the prevalence of framing norms
that call for up or down decisions all figure in this conclusion. But
62. Indeed, if a comparative inquiry suggested that European or Japanese judges, oper
ating without juries, suppressed the product rule in a manner different from their American
counterparts, we might connect this observation to the norm of shorter and much less expen
sive trials.
63. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?:
Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87 (1999).
64. See articles cited supra note 63.
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where two or more issues must be decided for a party to prevail, the
insight reflected in the product rule suggests some interest in the con
fidence or precise assessments of the decisionmakers. On the other
hand, we may decline to ask for precise assessments by judges for the
same reason suggested with respect to lay juries, to avoid strategic
voting.65
The literature on judicial panels can safely avoid the Jury Theorem
not only because these panels are fairly small but also because these
panels are competing over arguments and even preferences such that
the basic requirements for the Jury Theorem are often absent. Put dif
ferently, even where we think the Jury Theorem applicable to what
these judges do, the size of the panel and the norm of simple-majority
decisionmaking makes us less than comfortable with issue-by-issue de
cisionmaking.
Given small panels and simple-majority decisionmaking, outcome
voting can substitute for the product rule. Imagine, for example, an
appeals panel with three members deciding a case with two issues of
the sort described earlier. Any one judge who is confident in finding
for the plaintiff on both issues is of course pleased with an outcome in
plaintiff's favor. But a judge who thinks plaintiff should probably win
on the standing issue and just barely win as a matter of substantive law
might well internalize the product rule with the intuition that it is
more likely than not that at least one of the two issues should be de
cided against plaintiff, in which case plaintiff should lose. Inasmuch as
we do not normally send appeals to a single judge this sort of thinking
is hypothetical, except that if we ask three judges for votes as to out
come (only), we might with sincere voting66 get a different result than
we expected after tallying their views as to the two issues. The jury
judge difference is thus fairly straightforward. An optimistic, positive
view is that the product rule is reasonably suppressed on fairly large
juries with supermajority votes and it is imperfectly supplanted by
outcome voting in the case of small, majoritarian judicial panels.67

65. Although we could presumably ask whether the judge's confidence exceeded some
level or not. See supra Section 11.C.5.
66. The same might be true with strategic voting if judges internalize the product rule.
67. Imagine, for example, that we need two issues decided for plaintiff on appeal in or
der to uphold a finding of liability against the defendant. If we denote a decision on an issue
for plaintiff with a "1" and a decision against plaintiff with a "0," then a judge working alone
whose assessment is (0,1) or (1,0) should decide against plaintiff, while one who finds on
both issues for plaintiff, denoted as (1,1), will find for plaintiff. Imagine now that Panel A
consists of three judges whose assessments are (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), and that Panel B in a
different case has assessments of (1,1), (1,1), and (0,0). Panel A 's issue voting yields a win for
plaintiff, but two of the three judges would with outcome voting decide against plaintiff.
Panel B decides for plaintiff by a 2-1 vote either way. With numerous panelists, issue voting
seems superior. There are, after all, two affirmative (and, by hypothesis, independent) as
sessments for each issue on the two panels. But on a small panel the argument for outcome
voting is that we may mimic what the product rule would have done with precisely recorded
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Finally, it is useful to mention the possibility of vote switching by
judges. Judges might attempt to maximize their power through some
combination of strategic voting and vote trading.68 Two judges might
trade across cases if they feel strongly about different issues, but they
might also trade in order to improve their chances of "victory" on is
sues regarding which they are highly certain. Jurors rarely have these
options and, in any event, the very ideas of preferences and power re
mind us that we have left the domain of the Jury Theorem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Law often sets out multiple requirements for liability or other re
sults. These requirements can be questions about facts or about the
applicability of legal rules. In turn, judges and juries that find facts and
law and apply (or find) law are sometimes uncertain about their judg
ments and must therefore combine multiple assessments. There is no
dispute as to how to combine the chances of arriving at some sequence
when flipping a fair coin multiple times, but this method of combina
tion, known as the product rule, is remarkably absent from statutory
and judicial vocabularies. Lawmakers either violate or, more often,
obfuscate this rule. They do not say what they do and they do not in
struct others as to how to combine probabilistic assessments. I have
referred to this obfuscation or refusal to follow logic as amounting to a
suppression of the product rule and, equivalently, as presenting the
puzzle of the math-law divide.
Roughly speaking, I have suggested that we can in fact explain, or
at least rationalize, law's suppression of the product rule where multi
member panels are used - especially when operating with a super
majority decision rule. First, the larger the panel and the greater the
majority, the more confident we can be that the aggregate assessment
is correct - and indeed more likely to be correct than any individual
non-expert assessment. This is a fairly direct application of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem. But this effect on its own is modest both beassessments. Panel B's outcome demonstrates, of course, that outcome voting is not a perfect
substitute for precise assessments plus the product rule.
68. If we set aside the aggregation and product rule issues discussed here, a decent ar
gument for outcome voting is that it removes the temptation to vote strategically. The more
we ask for outcomes, the less room there is for strategic voting. My concern in this Article is
not so much with issue and outcome voting on their own but rather on explanations for the
suppression (or recognition) of the product rule. If one kind of voting substitutes for the
product rule, and there is reason not to apply the product rule directly, then there is a good
argument for that voting procedure.
Vote trading might be defended if we thought judges felt most intensely when they were
also most expert or even most confident. On the other hand, judges might recognize subject
matter expertise in their fellow judges, and defer accordingly. It seems more likely that
trading would elevate judges' preferences, which in tum threatens to diminish the (Jury
Theorem style) advantage of using more than one judge - offset, however, by the increased
chance of bowing to real judicial expertise.
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cause the jury and judicial panels we use are not huge and because it is
not always clear when the Jury Theorem's assumptions - including
the existence of a right answer as well as voters who are more likely
than not to reach this answer - are met.
But there is a second feature of juries and other panels. It is that
when a panel - and especially one that is unanimous or otherwise su
permajoritarian - finds something to be more likely than not, our
best guess following this panel's observation is a likelihood much more
than that "more likely than not" decision point. The idea is that the
panel's supermajority members are likely to be distributed across a
range; they may well have reported the lower end of their group's as
sessments or even something below that because they were simply
asked whether the preponderance of the evidence standard had been
met. And our best assessment is made by drawing inferences from the
assessments of all the members of the panel. In short, the product rule
might be suppressed because the multiple assessments point to greater
likelihoods than are reported. Finally, we do not ask the panel directly
to carry out just such aggregation assessments with precision (followed
by an application of the product rule) because to do so would be to
encourage strategic voting.
I have also suggested, though less insistently, that we might turn
the direction of the argument around, aiming to explain not the sup
pression of the product rule but the occasional use of supermajority
voting rules. Courts might use such rules to promote jury deliberation
and other familiar values, but they might also do so in order to obviate
the need for the product rule. One problem with this approach is that
it requires the claim that most jury cases present multiple, independ
ent requirements or assessments.
Finally, there is the interesting comparative question. Future work
may show that single judges, working without juries, incorporate the
product rule in their rulings while their counterparts suppress the
product rule in instructing juries. If so, the arguments advanced here
will glisten in the comparative light. After all, my claim has been that
conjunction strategies change in the face of aggregation advantages
and difficulties. Single judges working alone obviously do not face the
problem of aggregating non-identical assessments or of assessing the
applicability of the Jury Theorem. But what if there is no evidence in
American or foreign jurisdictions that lone judges combine likelihoods
any differently from sizeable juries? We will have a theory that might
work well enough in its limited domain, but have no real reason for so
limiting its domain. We might then use the connection between con
junction and aggregation to help decide when to impose (or when to
expect) supermajority voting rules.

